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Shall We Enhance? A Debate
Just a few decades ago, “mind-expanding”
drugs were the province of the avant garde,
the rebellious, or the just plain irresponsible.
Now, much as laser surgery enhances our
eyesight, new drugs may enhance the power of
the mind not only for the risk-taking few but
for virtually any of us, on demand. While
some observers argue that such innovations
are only the latest in a long historical march
toward human betterment and should be
welcomed, others are more cautious. Tinkering
with an otherwise healthy brain can be counterproductive, dissidents argue. Cerebrum invited
Prof. Arthur L. Caplan, Director of the
Center for Bioethics at the University of
Pennsylvania, and Dr. Paul R. McHugh, a
member of the President’s Council on Bioethics,
to debate the “enhancement” issue from the
sides that each of them favors. Prof. Caplan
and Dr. McHugh ﬁrst put forward their
positions in written statements, which they
then exchanged to write rejoinders. They used
as the fulcrum of their debate the report of
the President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond
Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of
Happiness (from which a chapter on another
topic, age retardation, is excerpted elsewhere
in this issue).
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Caplan Statement

Straining their Brains:
Why the Case Against
Enhancement Is Not Persuasive

B

y some estimates, nearly 1.5 million
Americans have undergone laser
surgery to improve their vision.
The purveyors of this procedure often
promise that those who have it will see
better than they ever have before, even with
the aid of glasses or contact lenses. Laser
surgery sometimes can give eyes better
than 20-20 vision.
So have those who have undergone
this type of procedure and achieved
enhanced vision done something immoral?
If you were to read the recent report of the
President’s Council on Bioethics, entitled
Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the
Pursuit of Happiness,1 or a recent article by
a member of that council, Michael J. Sandel,2
you might believe they had.
The arguments the Council and its
members make against enhancement merit
close scrutiny, not only because they have
commanded much attention from policy
makers and the media but because these
arguments are mistaken. And as new
knowledge about enhancing another part
of the human nervous system—the brain—
becomes available, it is all the more important that ﬂawed moral reasoning does not
hinder how this knowledge is used.

WISHING FOR BETTER BRAINS

Beyond Therapy is not mainly focused on
new knowledge of the human eye or brain
per se or how such knowledge might be
used to enhance humanity. It is mostly
concerned with efforts to improve children
through genetic manipulation, gene therapy,
and pharmacological agents, as well as with
efforts to extend life and control aging
through genetic engineering and other
means. Nonetheless, it is easy to see that the
kinds of concerns fueling the angst that so
permeates this report are surely meant to
generally rebuke efforts to improve mental
performance as well.
For the most part, those who study
the brain have very little interest in enhancing or optimizing anything. They seek to
know how the brain works. Many scientists
and physicians are also keenly interested in
determining how, if possible, to repair the
devastating impact of injury, disability, and
disease that strike the brain.
But potential interest in brain
enhancement is enormous. Already, a
number of pharmaceutical and nutritionalsupplement companies are interested in
selling drugs that, like modaﬁnil, allow
individuals to go without sleep for longer
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periods of time than they otherwise could
or herbal substances that allegedly improve
memory or sexual enjoyment. These are,
arguably, enhancement drugs. And two
things have not escaped some scientists’
notice: that a drug capable of helping an
Alzheimer’s patient retain memory function
might also provide some enhancement
to those who simply have poor memory
skills; and that the market possibilities for
selling a drug such as a memory enhancer
are huge.
Many students, for example, are keenly
interested in any drug that might improve
their ability on tests or in musical, dramatic,
or athletic performances by allowing for

Each argument carries some
emotive force but is not a sound
basis for rejecting choices that
individuals might make to improve
or optimize themselves or their
children.
increased short-term memory, greater
attention span, or reduced anxiety. The
military has an interest in seeing mental
performance improved so as to increase
the combat effectiveness of individuals and
units. And not a few of us drink coffee, tea,
colas, and other stimulants to try to enhance
our cognitive performance. Many people
take various drugs, foods, and herbs, or
utilize technology such as virtual reality,
to try to enhance their mood, emotional
state, sexual enjoyment, or range of sensory
experience.

While these activities can be, and
sometimes are, abused, it would hardly seem
morally objectionable to try to improve
one’s mental abilities. Surely it is the critics
of efforts to improve the brain that bear the
burden of showing why this is wrong.
GOING BAD BY DOING BETTER

So what are the Council’s and Professor
Sandel’s moral concerns about efforts to
improve, enhance, or optimize our brains,
vision, or any other human organ or trait?
Their objections seem to be that:
1. The happiness or satisfaction achieved
through engineering is seductive and
will lead to a deformation of our
character and spirit;
2. Engineered improvements in performance are not authentic, not earned,
and therefore not morally commendable;
3. To accept enhancement for our
children will undermine and deform
the role of the parent.
None of these arguments provides
a sufﬁcient reason to oppose enhancement
or optimization, be it of our vision or our
brains, our own or our children’s. Each
argument carries some emotive force but
is not a sound basis for rejecting choices
that individuals might make to improve or
optimize themselves or their children. This
is not to say that every choice for enhancement or optimization is beyond moral
criticism or even morally valid. But it is
to say that those who would have us turn
away in principle from all forms of enhancement or optimization have not made a
convincing case.
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Consider this question from the
President’s Council, which suggests that
all efforts at enhancement will distort or
deform our character:
Indeed, why would one need to discipline
one’s passions, reﬁne one’s sentiments,
and cultivate one’s virtues—in short, to
organize one’s soul for action in the
world—when one’s aspiration to happiness
could be satisﬁed by drugs in a quick,
consistent, and cost-effective manner?

The concern expressed here is that if
we enhanced ourselves and our achievements
and enjoyments came easy, why would we
continue striving to be good and virtuous
people?
T H E W RO N G C U L P R I T

The problem with this argument is that
many people who do not now strive to be
good and virtuous are neither enhanced
nor optimized in any way. Laying the blame
for vice at the foot of enhancement ignores
the inconvenient fact that the desires for
quick returns, easy money, and instant
gratiﬁcation have nothing at all to do with
enhancement. They are traits of many, if
not most, human beings. The notion of
character development implicit in this
account has deeper roots in ﬁctionalized
accounts of young men at boarding schools
than in anything that accurately describes
how human beings actually evolve the
character traits that they manifest.
Still, the council broods in Beyond
Therapy, easy pleasures and cheap thrills will
make us weak and spineless. There is nothing
like misery to make us stronger. Sorrow,
courageously confronted, can make us wiser

and more compassionate. By the same kind
of logic, the selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants, when used
to reduce our sorrows, would endanger this
aspect of affective life. Because they dull
our capacity to feel psychic pain, they would
render us less capable of experiencing and
learning from misfortune or tragedy or
empathizing with the miseries of others. If
some virtues can be taught only through

Putting aside the fact that sorrow
can also drive some to suicide and
bring others to dysfunction and
despair, is it really true that improvement and virtue cannot co-exist?
very trying circumstances, those virtues
might be lost or at least less developed.
Putting aside the fact that sorrow can also
drive some to suicide and bring others to
dysfunction and despair, is it really true that
improvement and virtue cannot co-exist?
The Council’s argument is a bit like those
who worried what the military airplane
would do to the virtues of the ground
combat soldier—that the improved technology would make obsolete the kind of
courage needed for a frontal assault. Oh
really? Tell that to the ﬁghter pilot who
needs to evade ground-to-air missiles or to
the helicopter pilot evacuating a wounded
soldier under a barrage of ground ﬁre.
Improving performance is not necessarily toxic to virtue. It simply shifts how virtue
is manifest. It is highly unlikely that those
with enhanced vision or muscles or brains
would lack for challenges in the real world.
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S AT I S FAC T I O N N OT G UA R A N T E E D

So the case is not made that improving our
brains will destroy our character. What then?
The Council wrings its collective hands at
the prospect that enhancement of the brain
or optimization of brain performance will
cheapen the value of our experiences:
But seldom do those who win by cheating
or who love by deceiving cease to long for
the joy and fulﬁllment that come from
winning fair and square or being loved for
who one truly is. Many stoop to fraud to
obtain happiness, but none want their
feeling of ﬂourishing itself to be fraudulent.
Yet a fraudulent happiness is just what the
pharmacological management of our mental
lives threatens to confer upon us.

Translation: If you don’t really earn
your performance, if you do not sweat and
toil at it, then it will not be authentic, and
it will ultimately prove unsatisfying. One is
tempted to ask who is writing this stuff—is
the Council somehow psychically channeling
our Puritan Protestant ancestors?

Life is full of many pleasures that
are not earned by testing our limits
but that are fully and thoroughly
enjoyed.
Certainly it is exciting to achieve
satisfaction by testing our limits, by seeing
what we can achieve by striving, struggling,
and working to overcome innate boundaries. But it is also very satisfying to have
beneﬁts that simply come from out of the
blue or through good fortune. No people
with enhanced vision that I have ever

encountered feel the least bit of guilt,
shame, or doubt that the improved vision
they enjoy is fraudulent because they did
nothing to deserve or earn it except pay
their money and let a laser do its thing.
Life is full of many pleasures that are not
earned by testing our limits but that are
fully and thoroughly enjoyed. Think of
the pleasure in winning the lottery; or in
being reassured that your friends like you
even though you cheat at cards, cannot
stop smoking, eat too much, or are sometimes boring; or in solving problems using
computers and any other form of technological assistance you can muster to aid
your fallible brain.
We do not always have to “earn”
our happiness to be really and truly happy.
Nor do we reject as fraudulent those things
that make us happy that we have done
little or nothing to earn. An enhanced
brain or improved cognitive functioning
would not in principle undermine the
ethos of authenticity that undergirds human
satisfaction because that infrastructure is
not as the Council depicts it. Authentic
happiness sometimes results from success
in the battle against limits, but authentic
happiness can also result from luck, happenstance, serendipity, gifts, indulgence,
whimsy, and, although the Council seems
unable to fathom the possibility, even vice.
I M P ROV I N G C H I L D R E N

Lastly, consider the concerns of the Council’s
Sandel writing in The Atlantic. He is
worried that if we seek to perfect our
children—to enhance and optimize them—
we will no longer see them as “gifts”:
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In a social world that prizes mastery and
control, parenthood is a school for humility.
That we care deeply about our children
and yet cannot choose the kind we want
teaches parents to be open to the unbidden.
Such openness is a disposition worth
afﬁrming … it invites us to abide the
unexpected, to live with dissonance, to
rein in the impulse to control.

Put aside the irony of the author, a professor
at a school (Harvard University) that
inspires parents to devote enormous
resources to enhance their children’s abilities
so that they may enter there, extolling the
idea of accepting your kids as they “are.”

Is there value to be found in accepting the random draw of the genetic
lottery with respect to one’s children?
Ignore the fact that the vision of parenting
put forward seems unduly bound by an
upper-class American vision of what makes
for desirable parenthood—no collective
parenting or parent-child estrangement
cloud Sandel’s vision. Is there value to be
found in accepting the random draw of
the genetic lottery with respect to one’s
children? Should a random point mutation
that produces a slight change in a trait, or
a spontaneous recombination of genetic
material, really be seen as the source of
value in creating the unexpected in our
offspring?
It seems to me that much of what
parents traditionally do is try to shape and
control their children. Would changing
what the accidents of nature produce really
result in a child that is any less the object

of parental design? And would such change
lessen parental affection for the child? It is
not self-evident that this must be so. One
can accept a gift, embellish, tweak, noodle,
and modify it in order to improve it, and
still cherish what was given as a gift.
The case against all enhancements is
not made. Which, again, is not to say that
all enhancements are, of necessity, good or
desirable. But it is to say that “in-principle”
objections to enhancement should not
deter those who seek to improve their
own minds or those of their children. 
References
1. President’s Council on Bioethics. Beyond
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Happiness. Washington, D.C. Dana Press, 2003.
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McHugh Statement

No Veterinarian to
“The Naked Ape” I

A

s I recount to colleagues our debate
within the President’s Council on
iBioethics leading to the publication
of the book Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology
and the Pursuit of Happiness, many ask,
“Why are you guys worrying about the
off-label use of medications” such as
growth hormones, steroids, stimulants,
and antidepressants? By “off-label” they
mean the use of these drugs and hormones
not, as originally intended, to cure people
of conditions such as depression, infection,
or hormone deﬁciency but to enable the
healthy to become stronger, quicker, or
taller than they would naturally. “After all,”
they note, “who’s to say where sickness
ends and health begins—and anyway, why
can’t folks try stuff as long as it doesn’t
hurt them?”
These natural questions are relatively
easy to answer, as they all in some way turn
on concerns over the risks involved in taking
medications. But I remind my interlocutors
that people do certainly sense other problems
in “off-label” medications and express their
concerns. Witness the recent outcry in the
newspapers, picked up and ampliﬁed by the
president’s State of the Union address, over
major league baseball players who increased
their strength—and disrupted the credibility
of their records—by using muscle-enhancing

steroids and growth hormones on the advice
of their trainers and physicians.
Some critics of this practice were concerned over the risks to health these professional athletes were prepared (or pressured)
to accept. Indeed, these risks are not trivial.
But many more were troubled by what
biologic enhancements implied about the
meaning of achievement in sport and the
values expressed in athletic competition.
A QU E S T I O N O F P U R P O S E

Several of my questioners did identify this
challenging question from the controversy
over sports by asking: “Just what are you
trying to preserve or defend when you
debate the use of medications to enhance
some trait, rather than treat an illness?”
I hold that answering this question of
purpose is central not only to the sports
issue but also to the mission of the Council
itself. Therefore, I begin by noting how
this Council was charged by the president
to spur public discussion on bioethics in a
fashion that would get beyond some simple
calculus of risks and beneﬁts to consider
what challenges to human values and moral
purpose the new discoveries in biomedicine
could bring to us as people. Sport is one
arena where such challenges would emerge,
but hardly the only one.
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Speciﬁcally, in working with our
chairman, Leon Kass, to produce Beyond
Therapy, we Council members explored
how medications with effects on mood
and cognition, so useful in treating certain
mental disorders, might alter a doctor’s
practice with people seeking to enhance
desirable traits.
Doctors, after all, do not see themselves as veterinarians to Desmond Morris’s
Naked Ape—workers who tinker with the
bodily structure and function of a human
as if they were simply beeﬁng up a biologic
machine. They hold that, as advisors and
teachers, they treat people who need more
than technological know-how in order to
thrive, who need help to understand what
goes into a good human life and how it can
go awry. However, as information spreads
about medications, some patients—perhaps
better called “clients”—are turning up asking
for and expecting novel pharmacologic
services from their doctors, services that
may not extend the patients’ best interests.
Beyond Therapy intends to spur the public
to think about these matters.
Case examples help make these ideas
about apt and inapt use of medications—
especially the newly discovered medications
—clear. Here are three, chosen because each
depicts a particular aspect of contemporary
life in a psychiatric practice and represents
a situation where human hopes and fears
are in play. In each, medications are an issue
even though a “quick ﬁx” with some medication not only would have fallen short of
a solution but might well have distracted
everyone from the central and deeply
human issues at the heart of the problem.

A F RU S T R AT E D YO U N G M A N

To begin: at least once a year, I am asked
to see some young man (seldom a young
woman) whose parents worry about his
school performance and are wondering
whether some medications—either sedatives
for his mild test anxiety or stimulants for
his mild distractibility—might enhance it.
The parents are gifted professionals with
long records of academic success and
honors (valedictorians, Phi Beta Kappa
election, etc.). They worry that their
son’s present school record and lack of
scholastic achievements matching theirs
indicate either that something is wrong
with him that I might ﬁx with one of
these new medications they have read
about, or that he has some unapparent
psychological conﬂict that I might resolve
for him.

My task in this situation is to get the
parents to forget about adjusting
him to their aims with medications
or anything else. I want them to
appreciate what he brings to them
and to all of us in life-afﬁrming ways.
The truth is that the son does not
have the superior IQ of his parents. The
statistical “reversion to the mean” inherent
in the genetic roulette of a polygenic
feature such as IQ has brought him a
somewhat lower capacity than his gifted
parents. But often he, and subjects like him,
more than balance this aspect of their makeup by displaying—and in fact surpassing
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their parents in—several other ﬁne human
characteristics. He may be handsome,
charming, athletic, graceful. These traits
are visible and acknowledged by all, even
though, on the day I see him, his most
prominent feature is his frustration over
disappointing his parents.
My task in this situation is to get
the parents to forget about adjusting him
to their aims with medications or anything
else. I want them to appreciate what he
brings to them and to all of us in lifeafﬁrming ways. I point out that no one
can “major in IQ” in life, but anyone can
use a whole variety of assets to make life
work for him or her. These parents need
to understand the young man for what
he is and use their talents—and social
connections if need be—to guide him
toward enterprises that will employ his
particular talents and skills to build a life
and a career. They should emphasize his
strengths, stop trying to make him more
like themselves, and give up their notion
(common, I’ve discovered, among the
gifted) that the only path to success in life
is the one they followed.
I do not immediately succeed in
this process with some of these parents,
primarily because at the start they assume
that my job is to do their bidding and
“ﬁx” the young man rather than reinterpret their situation for them. But with
time I can usually win them over, thanks
mainly to the natural affection all parents
have for their offspring, but also because
I, an outsider, embarrassed them into
thinking about the gifts of life by emphasizing what is attractive about their son.

R I G H T F E E L I N G S , W RO N G O B J E C TS

Here is a second prototypic example of
how assumptions about life can, in the
present era, prompt a search for enhancement medications that misses the point.
A young woman arrives in my ofﬁce
depressed and concerned about what she
imagines to be some ﬂaw in her psychological makeup that renders her unattractive
to others. Her concerns, it turns out, have
emerged from several failed romances.
Each seems to have followed the same
course: she meets an attractive young man
and develops a relationship that rather
promptly—as is customary with young
people now—becomes an intimate one.
After some months, and just as she has
begun to hope they will marry and start
a family together, he tells her he is “not
ready” for such a serious commitment and
its attendant responsibilities. She concludes
he is not sufﬁciently interested in her,
and soon they part.
The repetitiveness of this experience—
right down to the stock expression “I’m not
ready”—leads her to believe that something
about her is to blame. She wonders, as she
reﬂects on her feelings and her behavior,
if she’s “too intense,” “too possessive,” or
“too needy.” She’s certainly disheartened
and demoralized, and she asks me for
medication for her mood and perhaps
some other medications that would reduce
her anxiety around men—making her perhaps more “relaxed” about these matters.
I notice how she is distressed and
concerned about male withdrawal but seeks
to explain it as a result of her shortcomings.
With these ideas in my mind, I try to show
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her that, in expecting intimacy to lead to
commitment, she is the one who is acting
in a natural way, and her boyfriends are not.
I tell her that she needs neither a sedative
for her thoughts nor an antidepressant
to rid her of her low mood but a better
assessment of the situation she faces.
When I eventually point out how
contemporary sexual mores, supported by
easy contraception, tend to emphasize what
one receives from an intimate relationship
rather than what one brings to it—i.e. taking
something from one another rather than
making something together—she may
wonder, primarily because she has never
heard such ideas from a doctor, whether
she has come to the right ofﬁce. Only after

She came with the belief that her
moods and distress represented some
set of pathologic features in herself.
I try to help her appreciate that she
has been cooperating with a cultural
system that permits males to remain
perpetual adolescents.
ﬁguratively catching her breath does she ask
exactly what I think she should do in these
situations. I respond to this question by
saying she will need some coaching or
“cognitive-behavioral” psychotherapy as she
approaches affectionate relationships in the
future. I suggest several therapists—usually
female—who have helped other young
women I referred.
She came with the belief that her
moods and distress represented some set

of pathologic features in herself. I try to
help her appreciate that she has been cooperating with a cultural system that permits
males to remain perpetual adolescents (and
even offers them a standard excuse line,
“I’m not ready”), postponing indeﬁnitely
their transition into responsible—read
“stand-up”—men. Her goal should be to
ﬁgure out how to stop cooperating with
this system and its misuse of her.
T E M P T I N G T H O U G H TS

As a ﬁnal example of the temptation to
use pharmacologic tools for enhancement,
I offer an experience and thought experiment
from my personal, rather than professional,
life. I enjoy periodic, several-day visits from
my 8-year-old grandson. We do many things
together, but one that we enjoy is playing
chess and analyzing situations on the board.
He’s pretty good for a youngster, and for
a period of about half to three-quarters of
an hour, we can concentrate together on
these problems.
But as the time passes I sense his attention waning and eventually—sooner than I do
—he wearies of these “if the opponent makes
that move then we should follow with this
response” analyses. I’ve learned to offer him
something else to do with me then—best
something more physical such as running or
throwing a ball—all with the tacit agreement
that “maybe later” we could return to chess.
The thought experiment, though,
comes as I realize how, with a medication
such as Ritalin, I could hold him longer at
the chessboard, enjoy the interplay with him
for a greater stretch of time, and even, so I
might rationalize, make him a better player.
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The thought is enough to identify the
injustice. To use my medical skills to draw
something I want from him rather than to
accept and support the break from effort
his nature seeks is to deny, indeed belittle,
his boyhood. “More recess, less Ritalin”
I regularly prescribe to people worried about
how boys tend to be restless in class. I’m
even more conﬁdent of the wisdom in that
prescription after spending time so happily
with a ﬁrst-rate example of the group.
C H E AT I N G V I C TO RY O F I TS M E A N I N G

With these case examples in mind, let us
now return to the sports problem that may
be the greatest source of public interest and
disquiet over pharmacologic enhancements
today. I hold that the expressions of
concern brought out in those discussions
resemble in many ways the concerns raised
in my clinical examples. I also believe that
some aspects of the solutions likely to be
effective for these athletes will apply to
practice with patients such as I’ve described.
Much will depend on attitudes in the community about what is to be admired and
what is to be scorned, about what advances
and what retards our human pursuits.
William James referred to organized
sports as “the moral equivalent of war.”
And for most of us that’s just why we are
drawn to the games, as both players and
spectators. Nowhere else can we see human
beings struggling to be their best, displaying
the strenuous, dare one say manly, virtues
of courage, tenacity, and self-sacriﬁce for
some collective victory in an arena where
blood is not shed and lives are not lost. At
its best, organized sport works as a tangible

and direct moral educator to us all, by
identifying people who have honed wonderful physical gifts and, often, demonstrating
how adversity and stress can be overcome
through persistence and bravery put into
play with a sense of purpose.
Major League Baseball should free
itself from the misuse of steroids and other
drugs not just by appropriate supervision,
rules, and stiff ﬁnes but as well by ridicule,
contempt, and moral reprobation of the
offending athletes by their peers and by
the supporters of the game. This reproving
stance derives from rejecting the “anything
goes” view of athletic competitions and is
inspired by respect for the opportunity in
sport to witness remarkable combinations
of human gifts and virtues, played out in a
framework of conventions that give those
gifts and virtues a stage. Artiﬁcially altering
the players—distorting their bodies and making them somehow chemically different from
the rest of us—debases this opportunity.
Most of us can see these points
immediately and appreciate that unnatural
procedures, by severing performance from
effort, cheat victory of its meaning. In the
same way, I try to encourage my patients to
see the real goals embedded in their pursuit
of happiness. Thus I do not aim to cover
over a painful but natural response to life
circumstances or tone up some cosmetic
ﬂaw. Rather I seek to help a person ﬁnd
coherence and direction in his or her life
so as to resolve some of the difﬁculties
prompting the trip to a psychiatrist. “Man
does not live on pharmaceuticals alone,”
we might say today in updating the Gospels.
I apply that lesson repeatedly in my ofﬁce.
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Each person in my case examples
needed help to recognize just how, like
the use of steroids by baseball players, the
pharmacologic interventions they wanted
would be wrong. Here medicating might
not be against some formal rule, but it
would in important ways distort the goal
of treatment and often turn attention away
from the real nature of the situation. In all
three cases this goal was to recognize the
challenging realities built into human life
and how best to meet them. The ﬁrst case
illustrated how one should recognize and
honor the diversity of excellence to be
found among people, the second how to
recognize and honor the natural assumptions of human affection, and the last
how to recognize and honor psychological
characteristics built into and appropriate for
the different stages of human development.
To intervene with medications in any of
these examples might have helped achieve
some narrow aim but would have done so
at the price of loss of reverence for the good
things that life, outside our command,
brings to us and prompts us to fulﬁll.
T H E M O R A L B OT TO M L I N E

As anyone who reads Beyond Therapy will
quickly appreciate, the Council was not
calling for laws to deal with these issues of
“off-label” treatments. We thought and
wrote differently here than we would
about matters where life and death—or
even physical well-being—are involved.
Different members brought different experiences with biologic enhancements to this
discussion. All, though, wanted to help the
public to appreciate both what great goods

these new medicines bring to our treatment
of the mentally ill and the many aspects of
human life at stake as our knowledge in
psychopharmacology expands.
In particular, I wanted to emphasize
what psychiatric practice taught me about
what to behold, identify, and admire in
individual lives. I’ve learned that, when no
psychiatric illness disrupts the picture and
calls for medical relief with these new
medications, these assets usually offset the
challenging blemishes that remain for each
of us to overcome. People triumph over
these milder handicaps when they are helped
to make sense of their circumstances, live up
to their gifts, and cultivate those strenuous
virtues of self-sufﬁciency, energy, loyalty,
and independence of mind that grow with
practice over time.
As a doctor, the moral “bottom line”
for me in the use of all medications (not
just the new ones) is: Turn to a medication
only after you have thought carefully about
the patient’s symptoms and complaints and
decided these issues represent or express
some disruption of brain function or
structure in need of medical management.
Otherwise, help those who consult you to
see what they can do to make better sense
of their situations and deal more effectively
with them. If this method of assessment
is followed, then the new discoveries in
pharmacology will work as they were
designed and a coherent, effective practice
of psychiatry will proceed for the beneﬁt
of all. 
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Important Treatment, Wrong
Diagnosis: Enhancement is not to
blame for the abuse of autonomy
Every so often a physician will complain to
me that it is impossible to get families to
consent to the cessation of life-extending
medical treatments for their terminally ill
loved ones. These doctors are not talking
about borderline cases; they are talking
about situations in which a patient is in
the ﬁnal throes of cancer, the last stages
of AIDS, or at the brink of expiring from
congestive heart failure. But, still, the
family insists that everything be done.
My response is to ask why the doctors
are listing options and alternatives. When
they look at me with an expression of
confusion, I elaborate: Why are they not
presenting their recommendation about
what they believe is the appropriate thing to
do—in these particular situations, to shift
from therapeutic interventions to palliation.
The physicians sometimes angrily retort
that as someone in the ﬁeld of bioethics
I should realize that their role is not to tell
people what to do (as these professionals’
role models and mentors once did) but to
give patients and families choices consistent
with the doctrine of informed consent that
bioethicists have supposedly drummed into
their heads as key to the moral practice of
medicine. This line of argument does not

move me, I respond, as informed consent
is not simply giving people options and
alternatives. It is also sharing with them the
wisdom of experience and judgment about
what option is the best one to pursue.
Dr. McHugh’s comments on his
experiences with patients and families who
turn to the ﬁeld of medicine for pills and
nostrums to ﬁx the everyday woes of life
put me in mind of these conversations.
He correctly points out that the right
thing to do when confronted with parents
who want a pill to make their child smarter
or patients requesting a drug to calm
their anxieties about an unsatisfactory love
life is to offer counsel about the acceptance
of limits or the need to learn to cope
with the challenges of disrespectful,
outlandish, or crude behavior. Not every
insult, slight, failure, disappointment,
and challenge in life merits the prescription
of a pill.
Doctors are not waiters; they do not
simply respond to the orders and preferences of their patients. If bioethicists have
given medicine the idea that this is what
informed consent means, whether in the
ICU or in the practice of psychiatry, then
bioethics is wrong.
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That said, the fact that medicine has
become beguiled by respect for patient
autonomy does not mean Dr. McHugh
is right to commingle concerns about
enhancement with concerns about an
undue obeisance to patient preferences and
demands. While he is on the right path in
terms of providing sounder alternatives to
patients’ requests for “quick ﬁxes” and in
not yielding to their anger when he offers
direction rather than drugs, the source of
the more general problem is the medical
community’s overindulgence of patients’
demands—not the fact that they sometimes
demand enhancement.

The dislike of steroids is the dislike
of a dangerous drug. But it may or
may not extend to the professional
baseball player who has had laser
surgery to improve his vision.
Nor does the example of steroid use
in baseball take Dr. McHugh exactly where
he wants to go in cautioning about the
destructive inﬂuence of enhancement.
True, some forms of enhancement seem to
undermine fair play in sports. But not all.
I am reminded of a conversation I had
with an Olympic ofﬁcial who pointed out
that the pleasure Americans and Europeans
take in beating basketball teams from Africa
is in no way diminished by the fact that the
African teams are undernourished, poorly
coached, and have almost no access to
training facilities. We are so used to these
forms of enhancement in our sports that

not only do we not protest them, we are
downright angry if our favorite athletes
do not have access to the best dietitians,
masseuses, sports psychologists, sports
physiologists, and strength coaches.
The dislike of steroids is the dislike
of a dangerous drug. But it may or may not
extend to the professional baseball player
who has had laser surgery to improve his
vision or who pitches even better after
reconstructive surgery then he did before.
It is hard to draw the line when it
comes to enhancement. Surely medicine
should not simply prostitute itself to the
whims of its patients. The need to rein in
autonomy-run-amok in doctor-patient
encounters is real. However, the patient
who seeks improvement may, even postcounseling, continue to seek it. The point
is not that all enhancement is bad, but
that it is bad medicine to assume that if
a patient wants the enhancement then it
must be bad. 
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Where’s the Wisdom?
The book Beyond Therapy here under
discussion is a product of the President’s
Council on Bioethics. That preposition,
“on,” gets little attention but this debate
demands that we note what it implies.
The Council is not a crew of bioethics
experts presenting its judgments to the
world. It is an assembly of scientists, physicians, and humanists deliberating on the
mandate and portfolio of bioethics itself.
By discussing vexatious biomedical matters
and publishing treatises drawing from
these open discussions, we are ultimately
trying to discern whether the relatively
new discipline of bioethics is entitled to
special standing or authority as a body of
organized thought enriching the alliance

Professor Caplan treats all these
questions off-handedly—likening,
I have to suppose, any concern for
the huge increase in Ritalin
prescriptions for children to worries
over the American appetite for
Starbucks coffee.
between physicians and the public. Speciﬁcally, does it improve upon the physician’s
traditional ethics of recognizing good practice in enterprises that function (to quote
the Hippocratic Oath) for “the beneﬁt of
the sick”?

Professor Caplan, an academic and
highly regarded bioethicist, is a spokesman
of this new discipline, and thus I’m deeply
disappointed that his views on the matters
dealt with in Beyond Therapy are so dismissive.
We have heard rumblings of dissatisfaction
with our Council’s thought and leadership
from him, so I was eager to see a thoughtful
recasting of the speciﬁc issues we raised that
might amplify our efforts or display alternative
ways to come at them. Rather, Professor
Caplan disparages the whole enterprise to
consider and debate potentially deleterious
sides to the promiscuous use—“beyond
therapy”—of pharmacological treatments.
The Council members certainly knew
the value of these medications for the sick
but thought it wise to consider how they
might be used—or requested—when no
sickness was involved. Call our endeavor a
needed break in the headlong rush toward
nonmedical exploitation of biotechnology,
a pause to consider any Huxleyan brave
new world implications that might rest
within the marvelous medical advances
provided by modern drugs that affect the
mind and brain.
Beyond Therapy boils down to the
following questions: Are there any serious
problems to discuss here? Do, as Professor
Caplan claims, only Rugby-School-coldshower folk worry about biotechnology
just as they abjure all creature comforts?
Are there things about human nature that
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we want to preserve when thinking about
prescribing these new medicines?
Professor Caplan treats all these
questions off-handedly—likening, I have to
suppose, any concern for the huge increase
in Ritalin prescriptions for children to
worries over the American appetite for
Starbucks coffee. Not only is his response
to the book a rebuke to the Council’s
effort, his answer to any concern expressed
by the Council is to tell us to get with the
program of modernity and stop bothering
everybody with trivia.
But he often seems to miss the point.
For example, he sees us as worrying that
“seductive” promises of bioengineering
“deform the role of parent.” We do have
concerns over “seduction” but not because
these promises “undermine…the parent.”
Rather, they distort everyone’s—parent
and child’s—attitude towards childhood
in exactly the way pushing kids to attend
Harvard, a practice apparently deplored by
Professor Caplan, does.
I spoke as a practicing psychiatrist
about my worries with some of the empty
promises carried by the new pharmacology
in case examples I won’t repeat here. But
I’d like to mention something other than
the ﬂippancy of Professor Caplan’s exercise.
I detect no sense of direction in his
commentary. As we doctors strive to help
patients separate the real from the false, we
can hope that bioethics, for which Professor
Caplan speaks, might one day come up with
better insights than suggesting we meet all
demands for therapy, especially novel ones,
by going with the tide. My cautions about
enhancement are no resistance to change

but recognition of how, for doctors,
going with the tide may mean forsaking the
responsibility—and opportunity—to consider new technologies in the light of wisdom
derived from living and sympathetic contact
with real people. Proposing the treatment
that best allows a patient to ﬂourish is seldom
simple, especially when many treatment
programs are available and each carries its
own complications. Surely physicians can
reasonably expect their professional ethics
to offer some principled inclination or
direction for their practices, given the
weight of responsibilities they carry.
Without thoughts that provide a
sense of direction—such as emerges from
the reﬂections in the Hippocratic tradition
about the nature of “beneﬁt” and “harm”
in their dealings with patients—physicians
are at the mercy of technologic illusions and
detachments. These tend to promote actions
at costs they don’t anticipate and exact a
penalty, in loss of trust, that they are called
to pay when damage cannot be repaired.
Our Council published Beyond Therapy
not to worry the public or to legislate
practices but to spur discussion about often
unseen features of the new biotherapies.
Bioethics was spawned from the philosophical faculties but is now being tied
more and more into medical discourse.
If Professor Caplan’s unconcerned response
is representative of expert opinion from
the new world of “ofﬁcial” bioethics, the
public will be disappointed by the contributions from that quarter and may wonder
about the value of that new enterprise in
thought. 

